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I. INTRODUCTION 
The constitutional (and other) cases the Supreme Court of Canada handed 
down during the recent year confirm it: the contextual approach is the right 
approach.1 One should no longer be seen to be abstract and formalistic. 
The so-called contextual approach is the proper one for the analysis of 
equality rights,2 the concept of cruel and unusual punishment3, the principles of 
fundamental justice,4 the issue of reasonable limits imposed on rights,5 as well 
_______________________________________________________________ 
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Montreal. This paper was originally presented 
at the April 6, 2001 conference entitled “2000 Constitutional Cases: Fourth Annual Analysis of the 
Constitutional Decisions of the S.C.C.” sponsored by the Professional Development Program at 
Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1
  It is now “wrong” not to be contextual. See, for example, the argument made in Little 
Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, 2000 SCC 
69, that the harm-based method using a community standard in obscenity cases was “insufficiently 
contextual” to respect equality rights of the gay community (at para. 53).  
2
  See for example, Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, and Granovsky v. Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703.  
3
  See for example, R. v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2001 SCC 1, at para. 74, and R. v. 
Morrisey, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, 2000 SCC 39, at para. 27. 
4
  See, for example, in United States of America v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 
7, the opinion of the Court, at para. 64, quoting Mr. Justice La Forest in Kindler v. Canada 
(Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, who had “referred to a s. 7 „balancing process‟ in which 
the global context must be kept squarely in mind.” The Court adds, at para. 65: “It is inherent in 
the Kindler and Ng [Reference re Ng Extradition (Can.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858] balancing process 
that the outcome may well vary from case to case depending on the mix of contextual factors put 
into the balance.” 
5
  See, for example, Little Sisters, supra, note 1, minority at para. 217 and following, and 
L‟Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and Bastarache JJ.‟s concurring opinion in R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 
S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2, at para. 131 and following.  
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as for the interpretation of provincial human rights codes6 and for the 
application of the common law confessions rule.7 
Apart from the obvious rhetorical aspect of this “contextualist” trend, the 
precise nature and content of a contextual approach remains somewhat 
uncertain. Indeed, I am not at all sure that the recent cases have clarified the 
confusion which surrounds this question.8  
As a legitimate first impression, one might expect that a contextual approach 
in judicial reasoning would lead to a serious consideration of empirical facts 
and data relevant to constitutional issues. Such an approach would force judges 
to go beyond the interpretation of legal concepts and rules and to venture into 
the dangerousness of the real world. Dealing with facts of life would necessarily 
require evidence, and particularly social science evidence.  
Some judges have ventured down this difficult path in a few cases. One 
recognizes Madam Justice L‟Heureux-Dubé as the leader of this limited group.9  
But most of the time, the so-called “contextual approach” seems to be no 
more than a rhetorical device which labels a judicial approach as pseudo-
modern when in reality it has much in common with the former, more 
traditional one. The context referred to is often a context of legal norms of some 
sort,10 of values and of ideas. If the new judicial approach deals more explicitly 
with facts, those are often facts over which judges keep control: judges make 
judgmental facts the relevant and central ones; they “reason” the facts; they 
invent reasonable hypotheticals; they are satisfied with mere reasonable basis 
when things are uncertain. As such, there appears to be a mysterious category of 
facts for which evidence is not needed.  
_______________________________________________________________ 
6
  See, for example, Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la 
jeunesse) v. Montréal (City); Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la 
jeunesse) v. Boisbriand (City), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665.  
7
  See, for example, R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3.  
8
  Pinard, “La méthode contextuelle,” to be published in the January 2002 issue of the 
Canadian Bar Review.  
9
  For example, writing for the majority in Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. W. 
(K.L.), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 519, 2000 SCC 48, Madam Justice L‟Heureux-Dubé referred to the 
relevant social context, including “the frequent occurrence of child protection proceedings 
involving already disadvantaged members of society such as single-parent families, aboriginal 
families and disabled parents” (at para. 72), and the fact that children are often in danger in their 
families (at para. 74). See also L‟Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and Bastarache JJ.‟s concurring opinion 
in R. v. Sharpe, supra, note 5.  
10
  See, for example, Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la 
jeunesse) v. Montréal (City); Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la 
jeunesse) v. Boisbriand (City), supra, note 6, proposing a contextual approach in statutory 
interpretation but where context is defined in a very traditional way, as including “the other 
provisions of the law, related statutes, the objective of both the law and the specific provision, as 
well as the circumstances which led to the drafting of the text” (at para. 32).  
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I will try to explain this point of view with an overview of how some of last 
year‟s cases treated the facts. I will not presume to discover emerging 
jurisprudential trends or approaches, nor will I proceed with a thorough and 
detailed analysis of the cases. I will endeavour to establish links and I will ask 
questions. I am mainly concerned by what I perceive to be the tone or gist of a 
decision as regards process rather than with the actual result in the case.  
II. ANALYSIS 
This paper will briefly address four issues raised in the recent case law: the 
continued emphasis on human dignity in equality rights cases, the perceived 
need to use caution in relying on expert evidence, the construction of reasonable 
hypotheticals and the use of the rational basis standard.  
1. Equality Cases and the Emphasis on Dignity 
The increased emphasis placed on the human dignity aspect in equality rights 
analysis gives the impression that the relevant context becomes more and more 
a context of values, of opinions promoted and symbolic messages sent, rather 
than one of empirical facts about disadvantaged people. What counts is one‟s 
self-esteem, how one feels, how one is made to feel when one is denied a social 
benefit, and not the actual empirical facts, i.e., the loss or non-access to a 
“targeted ameliorative program,” for example.  
Following the path established in Law,11 the new cases dealing with equality 
rights also insist on human dignity as the central feature of an equality rights 
analysis. In Lovelace12 as in Granovsky,13 the Court found that the 
complainants‟ dignity had not been demeaned, that no doubt had been cast on 
their worthiness as human beings and therefore that there had been no violation 
of equality rights. However, the complainants were refused state-administered 
advantages, and I am not sure that the concrete, empirical conditions in which 
they lived, and the empirical consequences of that exclusion, played an 
important role in the judicial reasoning process. The key question was 
apparently not so much the actual effect of the exclusion in people‟s real life 
(though the Court acknowledged that “the appellant aboriginal communities 
have experienced layer upon layer of exclusion and discrimination”14 and that 
his exclusion from the Canada Pension Plan had a grave financial impact on Mr. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
11
  Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.  
12
  Supra, note 2. 
13
  Supra, note 2. 
14
  Lovelace, supra, note 2, at para. 90. 
166 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Job Name: SCLR14      Time:22:19       1st proofs  Date:Friday, February 10, 2012 
Granovsky)15 as the symbolic message sent by the state as a result of their 
exclusion.  
The Court alluded to the fact that a contextual analysis required a thorough 
consideration of “the social realities relating to their [the non-band 
communities‟] exclusion from, or non-participation in, the Indian Act regime,”16 
and admitted that Mr. Granovsky was “entitled to have taken into consideration 
the actual impact on him of the denial of that financial benefit.”17 However, one 
is left with the impression that by focusing on the message sent as a result of the 
exclusion and its impact on human dignity, the factual conditions in which the 
complainants lived were actually rendered irrelevant.  
If the approach is still a contextual one, it has more to do with a context of 
values, feelings, ideas and impressions than with an empirical one concerned 
with how the world works, with how people live, with “conditions matérielles 
d‟existence.” The assessment as to whether a person‟s dignity has been 
demeaned requires the very orthodox tools judges have always used to make 
value judgments. It is far from a wild judicial incursion into empirical facts. It 
preserves the judicial power to decide and limits the role that parties can play 
by bringing social science evidence to the courts.  
2. Closed Doors to Expert Evidence? 
One would think that a contextual approach is a wisely sceptical one when 
judges question the reliability of their common sense assumptions and are 
curious and open-minded about the development of new knowledge. 
Apparently, some people even understood the contextual approach as an 
invitation to introduce expert evidence. However, recent cases contradict this 
possible first impression that the contextual trend necessarily encouraged a 
judicial open-door policy towards expert evidence. Indeed, in some recent 
cases, the Court rather insisted on the limits and costs of expert evidence. 
The Court held in R. v. D. (D.),18 that expert evidence explaining the 
significance of the length of delay before disclosure in sexual assault cases 
against children was not admissible because it was not necessary. Mr. Justice 
Major, writing for the majority, discussed the dangers of expert testimony, 
including the usurpation of the role of the trier of fact, and its costs in terms of 
time and money. He wrote:  
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
15
  Granovsky, supra, note 2, at para. 69.  
16
  Lovelace, supra, note 2, at para. 4.  
17
  Granovsky, supra, note 2, at para. 69. 
18
  [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275, 2000 SCC 43.  
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Finally, expert evidence is time-consuming and expensive. Modern litigation has 
introduced a proliferation of expert opinions of questionable value. The 
significance of the costs to the parties and the resulting strain upon judicial 
resources cannot be overstated.19 
 
He considered that the affirmation at issue, being that “[i]n diagnosing cases 
of child sexual abuse, the timing of the disclosure, standing alone, signifies 
nothing,”20 was a “simple fact,” “a simple and irrefutable proposition” that the 
trier of fact was capable of understanding and which did not necessitate expert 
evidence. Interestingly, three dissenting judges would have admitted the expert 
evidence, considering that a proper understanding of this issue could be outside 
the “knowledge of the ordinary juror.”21 For these judges, the expert testimony 
could demonstrate that the consensus in the scientific community was contrary 
to the common-sense argument according to which the length of delay “casts 
doubt on whether the alleged assaults occurred.”22 
In much the same vein, in R. v. J. (J.-L.),23 the Court confirmed the trial 
judge‟s decision to refuse expert evidence presenting a new scientific theory in 
a criminal law trial. The Court warned against what it diagnosed as a “dramatic 
growth” in the presentation of expert evidence:  
 
Expert witnesses have an essential role to play in the criminal courts. However, the 
dramatic growth in the frequency with which they have been called upon in recent 
years has led to ongoing debate about suitable controls on their participation, 
precautions to exclude “junk science”, and the need to preserve and protect the role 
of the trier of fact — the judge or the jury.24  
 
The Court referred with approval to the set of stringent factors used by the 
Supreme Court of the United States to establish the “reliable foundation” 
criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence.25 The limits and difficulties 
inherent in relying on expert evidence were repeatedly stressed.  
Finally, in Parrott,26 the Court insisted that the evaluation of the ability of a 
witness (in this case a mentally challenged woman) to testify was within the 
domain of the judge‟s competence, being “the very meat and potatoes of a trial 
_______________________________________________________________ 
19
  Id., at para. 56.  
20
  Id., at para. 59. 
21
  Id., at para. 24. 
22
  Id., at para. 38.  
23
  [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, 2000 SCC 51. 
24
  Id., at para. 25. 
25
  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
26
  R. v. Parrott, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 178, 2001 SCC 3.  
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court‟s existence,”27 and that the testimony of an expert on that issue was not 
necessary.  
These cases rightly point out the dangers associated with expert evidence. 
They aim to curb what is said to be “a proliferation of expert opinions of 
questionable value.”28  
The approval of the Daubert test of reliability and the use of an exacting 
criterion of necessity may be wise, but they certainly do not promote a 
contextual approach where new knowledge is called upon to inform judicial 
decisions.  
And the very slim majority in two of the three cases29 illustrates how 
mysterious indeed is the distinction between facts we know and facts for which 
we need expert evidence. 
3. Reasonable Hypotheticals 
The quest for factual foundations in constitutional cases will sometimes take 
the form of an explicit elaboration of reasonable hypothetical facts having 
nothing to do with the case at bar, or even with social facts empirically 
observed.30  
It is a feature one encounters for example in the case law concerning section 
12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:31 the protection against 
cruel and unusual punishment. In Morrisey,32 the Court discussed the particular 
aspect of a section 12 analysis which requires a consideration of “reasonable 
hypotheticals.” If, by definition, hypotheticals are not facts that have been 
proven to the trier of fact according to the rules of evidence, they do not even 
have to be facts which exist in the real world and which can be empirically 
observed. They are, by definition, the product of the imagination. Mr. Justice 
Gonthier, writing for the majority, even admitted that there was an “ „air of 
unreality‟ about employing creative energy in crafting reasonable 
hypotheticals.”33 It is therefore not surprising that the Court could split as to the 
relevant criteria for establishing what constitutes “reasonable hypotheticals” 
within the meaning of section 12 of the Charter.  
_______________________________________________________________ 
27
  Id., at para. 57. 
28
  R. v. D. (D.), supra, note 18, at para. 56. 
29
  In R. v. D. (D.), as well as in Parrott, they were 4/7 majorities.  
30
  It was done, for example, in R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, where the Court 
considered that the determination of the constitutionality of the statute could be made in the light 
of its general effects, “under reasonable hypothetical circumstances” (at para. 41).  
31
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11. 
32
  Supra, note 3.  
33
  Id., at para. 32.  
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Even in cases where the concept of reasonable hypotheticals is not mentioned 
as such, one wonders whether it cannot actually explain the decision rendered. 
In Little Sisters,34 for example, the majority affirms that the statutory scheme 
“was capable of being administered with miminal impairment of the s. 2(b) 
rights …”35 and that “[i]f the Customs legislation operated as intended … the 
deleterious effects would be outweighed by its salutary benefit.”36 With this 
type of reasoning, one is closer to the elaboration of reasonable hypotheticals 
than to an empirical approach. It is hard to disagree with the dissenters in that 
case, who wrote that “the very nature of a contextual approach demands 
attention to how the Customs legislation is actually applied,”37 and that “[t]he 
government‟s burden under s. 1 is to justify the actual infringement on rights 
occasioned by the impugned legislation, not simply that occasioned by some 
hypothetical ideal of the legislation”38 (emphasis in original). 
Finally, it is also quite easy to conceptualize Sharpe39 as a case based on 
“reasonable hypotheticals.” Indeed, the outcome whereby two applications of 
the challenged provisions were “read down” because they were held not to be 
justified under section 1, had nothing to do with the facts of the accusation 
against Mr. Sharpe. Chief Justice McLachlin‟s discussion of the possible 
remedies confirms that the constitutional problems identified in the case had to 
do with hypothetical scenarios, and not with empirical discoveries.40 
4. Accepting Uncertainty: The Rational Basis Test 
Scientific uncertainty as regards certain social and psychological phenomena, 
and the consequent need for evidentiary refinements, have been acknowledged 
once again in the recent constitutional case law.  
_______________________________________________________________ 
34
  Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 
1120, 2000 SCC 69. 
35
  Little Sisters, id., majority, at para. 150. 
36
  Id., at para. 153. 
37
  Id., at para. 218. 
38
  Id., at para. 219. 
39
  R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2.  
40
  She writes, at para. 111, in fine: “Why, one might well ask, should a law that is 
substantially constitutional be struck down simply because the accused can point to a hypothetical 
application that is far removed from his own case which might not be constitutional?”, and at para. 
112: “Another alternative might be to hold that the law as it applies to the case at bar is valid, 
declining to find it unconstitutional on the basis of a hypothetical scenario that has not yet arisen. 
… While the Canadian jurisprudence on the question is young, thus far it suggests that laws may 
be struck out on the basis of hypothetical situations, provided they are „reasonable.‟ ”  
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In Little Sisters,41 applying a test that had been crafted and applied in a 
number of earlier cases, the Court was satisfied with the demonstration of a 
reasoned apprehension of harm caused by homosexual pornography.42  
In Sharpe,43 the Court used a “reasoned apprehension of harm standard,” as 
opposed to “scientific proof based on concrete evidence,” for the determination 
of the harm caused by possession of child pornography.44  
It is interesting to note that the same wording was used in the two cases to 
explain the Court‟s refusal to impose on governments “a higher standard of 
proof than the subject matter admits of.”45 One cannot be more blunt as to the 
uncertainty inherent in some phenomena, and the consequent need for the 
adjustment of evidentiary requirements.  
III. CONCLUSION  
The law has been able, for a long period of time, to feed itself on its own 
rules, constructs and principles. But many different factors have forced it to 
become more “contextual,” more knowledgeable and to take into consideration 
how the real world works.  
The trend towards an administration of justice which is more concerned with 
social context does, however, encounter difficulties when it comes to translating 
it into hard rules of evidence. The transition between the ethical concerns for a 
contextualized justice and the concrete domain of evidence is apparently a 
difficult one to manage.  
It seems that the law world will always entertain an ambivalent attitude 
toward the empirical world.  
We pretend that what happens in the world out there matters, but we arrange 
things a bit. For example, we elaborate a community standard to evaluate 
obscenity, but that standard then “involves an attribution rather than an opinion 
poll.”46 
_______________________________________________________________ 
41
  Supra, note 34.  
42
  The Court was unanimous on that issue: Little Sisters, majority at para. 66, and minority 
at para. 198.  
43
  Supra, note 39.  
44
  The Court was once again unanimous on that issue: id., majority, at para. 88, and 
concurring opinion, at para. 198.  
45
  See Little Sisters, supra, note 34, majority opinion, at para. 67: “While the social 
science evidence is thin, it must be remembered that in Butler itself [R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 
452] the Court accepted that the Crown could not be required to adduce a higher level of proof 
than the subject matter admits of,” and Sharpe, supra, note 39, majority at para. 89: “Complex 
human behaviour may not lend itself to precise scientific demonstration, and the courts cannot hold 
Parliament to a higher standard of proof than the subject matter admits of.” 
46
  Little Sisters, supra, note 34, majority opinion, at para. 56. 
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Distinctions like the one between adjudicative and legislative facts, which for 
a while gave the impression of magically opening all doors to social facts, are 
subsequently dismissed as incapable of playing that role.47  
We want facts, but we sometimes settle for common sense and inferential 
reasoning,48 value judgments or reasonable hypotheticals.  
There may be some sophisticated theoretical constructs justifying these 
different devices, but the bottom line is that one does not know which tack to 
adopt anymore: whether one should prepare concrete evidence or come up with 
reasoned hypotheticals or raise common-sense arguments.  
I wrote elsewhere that unpredictability of approach can be the most insidious 
form of judicial activism.49 But perhaps it is unavoidable.  
In principle, the law can only ignore the empirical realities of the outside 
world at the expense of its own credibility. At the same time, however, there are 
some legal constructs that exist independently of the outside world. Some basic 
assumptions of the legal system will survive a challenge on empirical grounds.50 
There are certainly very good reasons why judges should have the last say on 
some factual issues and, as Mr. Justice La Forest once wrote, avoid becoming 
the hostages of the parties.51  
_______________________________________________________________ 
47
  See Public School Boards’ Assn. of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General), [2000] 1 
S.C.R. 44, Mr. Justice Binnie delivering an order denying a motion to introduce fresh evidence of 
legislative facts on appeal. He wrote, at para. 5: “The usual vehicle for reception of legislative fact 
is judicial notice, which requires that the „facts‟ be so notorious or uncontroversial that evidence of 
their existence is unnecessary. Legislative fact may also be adduced through witnesses. The 
concept of „legislative fact does not, however, provide an excuse to put before the court 
controversial evidence to the prejudice of the opposing party without providing a proper 
opportunity for its truth to be tested.”  
48
  See, for example, Sharpe, supra, note 39, at para. 78: “To justify the intrusion on free 
expression, the government must demonstrate, through evidence supplemented by common sense 
and inferential reasoning, that the law meets the test set out in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.” 
49
  Pinard, “Activisme ou retenue dans la méthode: démarche en quête de points de 
repères,” in The Judiciary as Third Branch of Government: Manifestations and Challenges to 
Legitimacy, Proceedings of the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice Conference 
(Montréal: Éditions Thémis, 1999), at 213-41. 
50
  See for example, R. v. McIntosh (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.), quoted in R. v. J. (J.-
L.), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, 2000 SCC 51, where the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected expert 
evidence on the limits of eyewitness testimony.  
51
  Mr Justice La Forest wrote, in R. v. Edwards Books and Art, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at 
para. 195: “I do not accept that in dealing with broad social and economic facts such as those 
involved here the Court is necessarily bound to rely solely on those presented by counsel. The 
admonition in Oakes and other cases to present evidence in Charter cases does not remove from 
the courts the power, where it deems it expedient, to take judicial notice of broad social and 
economic facts and to take the necessary steps to inform itself about them.” 
172 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Job Name: SCLR14      Time:22:19       1st proofs  Date:Friday, February 10, 2012 
One is therefore compelled to admit that it seems inherently impossible to 
achieve absolute logical consistency in judicial approach within constitutional 
cases.  
